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ETHICAL ISSUES IN MANAGED CARE: CAN THE
TRADITIONAL PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
BE PRESERVED IN THE ERA OF MANAGED CARE
OR SHOULD IT BE REPLACED BY A GROUP ETHIC?
Eugene C. Grochowski*
Over the last decade managed care has become the dominant form of health care
delivery, because it has reduced the cost of health care; however, it has also created
serious conflicts of interest for physicians and has threatened the integrity of the
traditional physician-patient relationship. In this Article, Dr. Grochowski argues
that the efficiencies created by managed care are one time savings and will not in
the long run reduce the rate of rise of health care expenditures without a concomi-
tant plan to ration health care. He explores the traditional physician-patient
relationship and concludes:
a) that while rationing of health care is inevitable, physicians must
not ration care at the bedside;
b) that physicians must be advocates for their patients;
c) that physicians must avoid conflicts of interest whenever possible;
d) that physicians must put the needs of the patient before their own
self-interests; and
e) that physicians must act in ways to promote trust in their rela-
tionship with patients.
INTRODUCTION
Managed care' creates a tension between the treatment physi-
cians believe is medically indicated and the costs the managed care
* Associate Professor of Medicine at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine
and The Bioethics Institute of The Johns Hopkins University. Attending Physician in Renal
Medicine at Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center. FACP. B.A. 1968, Ph.D. 1973, M.D.
1974, Northwestern University.
1. See John K. Iglehart, Physicians and the Growth of Managed Care, 331 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1167, 1167 (1994). In his article, Iglehart states:
Managed care is a system that, in varying degrees, integrates the financing and deliv-
ery of medical care through contracts with selected physicians and hospitals that
provide comprehensive health care services to enrolled members for a predeter-
mined monthly premium. All forms of managed care represent attempts to control
costs by modifying the behavior of doctors, although they do so in different ways.
Id.
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organization (MCO) 2 is willing to pay.3 MCOs increase this tension
by creating incentives for physicians to spend less, which in turn
create a conflict of interest. MCOs, physicians, and others have
tried to reduce this tension by a variety of methods:
1) Changing what is medically indicated by requiring the
use of practice plans, by defining certain procedures or
therapies as experimental, and by simply declaring that
some procedures or therapies are not medically indi-
cated. These attempts at changing what is medically
indicated have paradoxically sometimes increased the
tension between physicians and MCOs.
2) Writing contracts that exclude certain benefits. This
straightforward method has met resistance in practice.
First, insurance laws limit what MCOs can exclude. 4 Sec-
ond, items that are excluded can be challenged in court.5
2. Managed care organizations vary greatly. The adage that when you have seen one
managed care organization, you have seen one managed care organization is true. See gener-
ally Carolyn Clancy & Howard Brody, Managed Care: Jekyll or Hyde?, 273 JAMA 338 (1995)
(pointing out that there are both good and bad managed care plans).
While I have tried to use the term MCO (managed care organization) instead of HMO
(health maintenance organization), the terms are often used interchangeably. Peter
Kongstvedt defines the terms as follows:
HMO-Health maintenance organization. The definition of an HMO has changed
substantially. Originally, an HMO was defined as a prepaid organization that pro-
vided health care to voluntarily enrolled members in return for a pre-set amount of
money on a [per member per month] basis. With the increase in self-insured busi-
ness, or with financial arrangements that do not rely on prepayment, that definition
is no longer accurate. Now the definition needs to encompass two possibilities: a
health plan that places at least some of the providers at risk for medical expenses,
and a health plan that utilizes primary care physicians as gatekeepers (although there
are some HMOs that do not).
MCO-Managed care organization. A generic term applied to a managed care plan.
Some people prefer it to the term HMO because it encompasses plans that do not
conform exactly to the strict definition of an HMO (although that definition has it-
self loosened considerably).
PETER R. KONGSTVEDT, THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 504-05 (1993).
3. SeeJOHN LA PUMA & DAVID SCHIEDERMAYER, THE McGRAw-HILL POCKET GUIDE
TO MANAGED CARE 135 (1996) ("The central ethical conflict in managed care is the tension
between what is medically indicated ... and what is financially available.").
4. See Vickie Yates Brown & Barbara Reid Hartung, Managed Care at the Crossroads: Can
Managed Care Survive Government Regulation, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 25, 33 (1998).
5. See Norman Daniels & James E. Sabin, Last Chance Therapies and Managed Care: Plu-
ralism, Fair Procedures, and Legitimacy, 28 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 27, 27-28 (1998)
("[D]enials of coverage for seriously ill people are highly visible. Even health plans that use
impeccable sciencegand patient-centered deliberation while trying to hold the traditional,
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Third, a plan that is too restrictive will not be very popu-
lar with employers who purchase these plans for their
employees.
3) Shifting the physician's duty from the patient to the
group of patients within the managed care organization.
This is a repudiation of the traditional ethic of patients
first.
The last method, which has the greatest potential to reduce this
tension, is the focus of this Article. The traditional physician-
patient relationship ought to be preserved.6 Other commentators,
however, have made the following arguments for shifting the phy-
sician's duty from the traditional patient centered ethic to a group
ethic:
7
1) Most physicians have already shifted their duty from the
individual patient to society, so why continue to assert
the traditional ethic?8
2) When physicians accept a panel of patients in an MCO,
they assume responsibility for all of these patients, even
the patients they never see.9
3) Given the need for rationing, making individual
spending decisions at the bedside (bedside rationing) is
more efficient than trying to make global spending
decisions that would apply to all patients (macro-level
rationing). Furthermore, because bedside rationing is
contractually specified line against unproven therapies risk horrendous publicity, expensive
litigation, and legislative mandates requiring coverage.").
6. See, e.g., Amber Barnato et al., Does Managed Care Require a "New" Medical Ethics,
ETHICAL ISSUES MANAGED CARE Q., Spec. Ed. 1998, at I (discussing the work of a group of
physicians convened by the Integrated Healthcare Association to re-examine the principles
underlying the Hippocratic Oath from a managed care perspective); Jerome P. Kassirer,
Managing Care-Should WeAdopt a NewEthic?, 339 NEW ENG.J MED. 397, 397 (1998).
7. See generally MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW,
ETHICS, & ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS (1997) [hereinafter HALL, MEDICAL
SPENDING DECISIONS] (arguing that medical spending decisions are inevitable and examin-
ing three alternative medical spending decision-makers: (i)patients paying for treatment out
of their own pocket; (ii)doctors making cost/benefit trade-offs at the bedside, (iii)third
parties imposing spending limits from outside the treatment relationship).
8. See Steven H. Miles & Robert Koepp, Comments on the AMA Report: "Ethical Issues in
Managed Care, "6J. CLINICAL ETHICS 306, 308-09 (1995); Peter A. Ubel & Robert M. Arnold,
The Unbearable Rightness of Bedside Rationing: Physician Duties in a Climate of Cost Containment,
155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1837, 1840-42 (1995). This argument ignores the fact that
ethics are normative, not descriptive.
9. See Mark A. Hall & Robert A. Berenson, Ethical Practice in Managed Care: A Dose of
Realism, 128 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 395, 398-99 (1998).
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not compatible with patient centered duties, the
traditional physician-patient relationship must change."'
Shifting from the traditional ethic to a group ethic will also
make physicians more comfortable and compliant with MCOs.
They will be able to justify their failure to put patients first. They
can be agents of the MCO, and at the same time assert their alle-
giance to the new medical ethics. Thus, some physicians will be
strongly motivated to adopt such an ethic. Eliminating the tradi-
tional ethic will also blunt their concern over the conflicts of
interest that exist in managed care.
Despite the motives of MCOs for desiring this change in ethics, a
larger issue is at stake: the undeniable need to ration medical care.
So, in addition to the title question, Can the traditional physician-
patient relationship be preserved in the era of managed care or should it be
replaced by a group ethic?, there are two related questions: (1) How
ought physicians be involved in rationing medical care, if it all? (2)
Do traditional ethics allow bedside rationing?
This Article attempts to answer these questions. Part I lists a
series of foundational assumptions. Because it is central to the
problem, Part II makes a case for rationing, one of the
foundational assumptions. Part III of the Article explores the
traditional physician-patient relationship, attempting to explicate
what is demanded of the traditional ethic, including advocacy,
trust, and avoidance of conflicts of interest." In this context it will
demonstrate how conflicts of interest erode trust. Part III further
argues that the traditional physician-patient relationship allows
withholding of marginally beneficial treatment, and concludes that
the ethics of the traditional physician-patient relationship ought to
be enforced and that conflicts of interest created by the practice of
giving physicians money to spend less on the care of their patients
ought to be abandoned. Part IV briefly describes how the
traditional ethos in medicine is changing, and how those very
changes support the need to preserve the traditional physician-
patient relationship. Part V discusses the problem of balancing
patients' interests with societal interests and concludes that
bedside rationing is incompatible with the traditional physician-
10. See Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693, 711-27
(1994) [hereinafter Hall, Rationing Health Care]; David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to
Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 155, 167-73 (1996).
11. Conflicts of interest will always be present in the physician-patient relationship, but
one can still strive to create an environment that avoids as many as possible and that mini-
mizes the impact of unavoidable conflicts of interest.
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patient relationship; and that because this is so valuable to patients,
bedside rationing must not be allowed.
I. FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions lay the foundation for this Article:
* Patients ought to be respected because they are persons.
* The physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary relation-
ship.
Whenever possible, conflicts of interest ought to be
avoided.
* Traditional ethics requires patient advocacy.
* Trust is important in the therapeutic relationship.
• There are other social goods equally as important as
health care.
* Rationing ought to be logical and made explicit.
* Because monetary resources are limited, and physicians
ought to be good stewards of scarce resources, physicians
should use the least expensive effective alternative.
* Rationing is necessary.
* All Americans have a basic right to available adequate
health care.
Except for the last two, these assumptions enjoy widespread
agreement. It is therefore necessary to say more about these last
two assumptions.
The last assumption creates a paradox. Although few people
publicly state that they disagree with this statement, at any one
time there are tens of millions of U.S. residents who are unin-
sured 2 and taxpayers seem unwilling to pay even a little more in
taxes to solve this problem. 3 Furthermore, a right to health care
12. See CHARLES J. DOUGHERTY, BACK TO REFORM: VALUES, MARKETS AND THE HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM 6 (1996) ("[I]n 1995, approximately forty million Americans had no health
insurance coverage. These people are not eligible for Medicare or Medicaid and do not
have any private insurance coverage. They are literally uncovered and would have to pay out
of pocket in the event health care were needed.").
13. Again, as Dougherty notes:
Polls since 1938 have shown a very high level of support for universal coverage, sup-
port that drops precipitously as the readiness to pay for it by increased taxation is
SUMMER 1999] 623
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depends upon a corresponding duty to provide health care. In the
U.S., there does not appear to be a duty incumbent upon anyone
to provide basic health care to all Americans. We have laws that
provide emergency care for anyone, but extend to neither preven-
tive care nor routine care. 14 Further discussion of this important
item is beyond the scope of this Article.
II. RATIONING 15
The penultimate assumption, rationing is necessary, is central to
this Article and requires further discussion. Regrettably, our society
has always rationed health care based on one's ability to pay; how-
ever, this form of rationing is neither necessary nor logical. It is
unnecessary because the health care system could be restructured
(for example, the government could pay for the health insurance
of all U.S. citizens instead of having employers pay just for their
employees). It is not logical because it arbitrarily binds insurance
to employment.
Nevertheless, rationing is necessary. First, if health care ration-
ing is defined broadly as limiting health care that patients want and
that may benefit them no matter how small the expected benefit,
16
no health care system can afford not to ration.
Second, physicians must ration the amount of time spent with
patients based on whether there are sicker patients who need at-
assessed. At the height of the debate over the Clinton plan, polls showed that an in-
crease of only thirty dollars a month (or $360 annually) could not get majority
support.
Id. at 10.
14. See Leigh M. Chiles, Note, Summers v. Baptist Medical Center Arkadelphia: A
"Disparate"Application of EMTALA's Terms, 50 ARK. L. REV. 559, 559 (1997) (discussing how
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), part of the Consoli-
dated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), is also known as the federal "anti-
dumping" statute and seeks "not only to prevent hospitals from refusing to treat patients
based on their inability to pay but also to stop the increasing practice of transferring patients
to nonprofit hospitals before stabilizing life-threatening conditions"). EMTA[A is codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
15. I will use the straightforward term "rationing" despite its negative connotations.
For example: "And, whereas during World War II rationing was common and meant simply
a 'fair allocation of scarce resources,' rationing now has an exclusively negative connotation
and is a code word for denial of care." GEORGEJ. ANNAS, STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF
AMERICAN BIOETHICS 212 (1993).
16. See generally Richard D. Lamm, Marginal Medicine, 280JAMA 931 (1998) (discussing
the inevitability of rationing and the conflict created by a narrow interpretation of tradi-
tional medical ethics).
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tention. Moreover, unless physicians are willing to see only a few
patients each day, they must also ration their time based on
whether their waiting rooms are full.
Third, any attempt to cut costs while preserving quality must
logically lead to rationing. It is wishful thinking to believe that sim-
ply cutting administrative costs and improving efficiency will keep
the lid on rising health care costs, because cutting the fat out of
health care creates only a one-time savings. It fails to change the
slope of rising health care costs that, prior to the emergence of
managed care, were unsustainable. Thus, to flatten the slope, the
amount of care delivered must be decreased. In order to maintain
quality of care while decreasing the amount of care delivered, a
sensible plan for limiting care-rationing is needed. 7
Fourth, benefits from newly emerging half-way technologies cost
more per benefit received."' Half-way technologies are sophisti-
cated ways to cope with medical problems instead of curing them.
For example, polio vaccine is an efficient, economical way to
prevent polio, but a fancy new expensive iron lung would be a half-
way technology. Consider hemodialysis, which keeps patients with
kidney failure alive, albeit at enormous costs each year 9 This is a
half-way technology that cannot be eliminated because an effective
way to prevent most cases of renal failure does not yet exist. Each
year, the techniques of dialysis are slowly refined (erythropoietin
for anemia, calcitriol for bone disease, and biocompatible
membranes), but at ever increasing expense. It is true that some
half-way technologies are cost effective, but few are cost saving (for
example, use of inhaled corticosteroids to treat asthma leads to a
net savings because this form of asthma treatment reduces
17. See William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of Current Cost-Containment Strategies:
Why They Can Provide Only Temporary Relief 257 JAMA 220, 220-21 (1987).
18. Consider the charges for imaging the lumbosacral spine with plain X-ray (two
views, $60.83) versus CT scan (non-contrast, $347.13) versus MRI (non-contrast, $506.64);
and consider the charges for a course of antibiotics with aminoglycosides (gentamicin $.75
per day) versus third generation cephalosporins (Cefotaxime $21.00) versus Quinolones
(Levofolxacin $24.70 per day). These were the charges at a local academic institution in July
1999.
Alternatively, one can look at the cost of an X-ray machine: $100,000; a computerized
automated tomography (CAT) scanner: $1 million; a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
machine $3 million, and a positive emission tomography (PET) scanner: $10 million. See
HALL, MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS, supra note 7, at 4.
19. See UNITED STATES RENAL DATA SYSTEM, 1998 ANNUAL DATA REPORT xviii (1998)
(stating that the total spending for ESRD in 1996 was $14.6 billion and that Medicare Dollar
per patient spending in 1996 for hemodialysis was $55,000.00; for peritoneal dialysis was
$48,000; and for transplant recipients was $18,000 (excluding the cost of organ procure-
ment)).
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hospitalizations).20 Therefore, to achieve more than a one-time
savings-to decrease the steep slope of rising health care costs-
these new technologies will have to be rationed.
One can look at rationing from several points of view:
* Inevitability: accept or deny
* Acknowledgment: overt or covert
* Mechanism: rational or default
* Process: by gate-keepers, by inconvenience, or by
policy
* Level: mega, macro, or micro.
We must accept the fact that rationing is necessary, and overtly
acknowledge that we ration care and that we need to develop a co-
herent plan for rationing. After all, the Latin root of rationing is
ratio or reason.2 1 The U.S. had a plan for rationing during World
War II, but rationing of health care today is not planned. It occurs
by default; it is unacknowledged, and as a consequence, it is often
unfair to the disadvantaged. Failure to acknowledge rationing is
deceptive and in the end will erode patient trust. Furthermore,
making rationing decisions explicit and publicly accountable is an
important first step in creating ajust health care plan.
The process of rationing is related not only to mechanism
(rational plan or by default), but also to whether it is overt or cov-
ert. Currently, gatekeepers ration care by deciding whether to refer
patients to specialists, by limiting access to expensive procedures
(CT scans, MRI, or bone marrow transplants), and even to proce-
dures which are not so expensive (chest X-rays, back X-rays, or
throat cultures). Some HMOs ration by inconvenience, requiring
excess paperwork or a laborious process of pre-approval as a way to
discourage physicians from ordering certain tests or therapies. 2
Alternatively, patients may be made to wait an exceptionally long
time for an appointment as a way to discourage use of certain serv-
ices. For example, a patient may want to see a dermatologist, but
the next available appointment for the approved dermatologist
20. See Harold C. Sox, The Dilemma of Internists: Caught in a Box with Technology, ACP
OBSERVER, May 1998, at 11 (giving coronary bypass surgery for left main coronary artery
stenosis as an example: the cost per year of quality life is reasonable, but the cost of surgery
exceeds the cost of treating angina).
21. See Martin Benjamin et al., What Transplantation Can Teach Us About Health Care Re-
form, 330 NEW ENG.J. MED. 858, 858 (1994).
22. See Gerald W. Grumet, Health Care Rationing Through Inconvenience: The Third Party's
Secret Weapon, 321 NEW ENG.J. MED. 607, 608 (1989).
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may be months away. HMOs ration by policy when they declare in
their contracts that a service is not covered. For example, most
HMO contracts state that experimental care is not a covered serv-
ice. This form of rationing at least has the advantage of being
overt, and sometimes even rational; however, it is not without con-
troversy because whether a treatment is experimental or not is
open to argument.
The level at which rationing occurs also has important implica-
tions. The mega-level has to do with allocation of funds to major
social and governmental programs like health care, education,
transportation, or defense. The macro-level describes the budget of
a health care plan. Will the plan (indemnity insurance, an HMO,
Medicare, or Medicaid), for example, pay for heart transplants, or
for artificial hearts, or for dialysis for all patients over 90 years of
age? If the plan decides that these are not covered services, then
the plan will not pay for anyone to get these services no matter how
beneficial the services may be. In contrast, micro-level rationing
involves decisions about individuals. For example, should we give a
heart transplant to this fifty year old diabetic man with severe pe-
ripheral vascular disease, or should we offer dialysis to this eighty-
year-old woman with metastatic breast cancer?
III. TRADITIONAL PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
Accepting that rationing is inevitable, that it ought to be overtly
acknowledged, and that it ought to be logical, I will now explore
the demands of the traditional physician-patient relationship with
respect to rationing medical care and to practicing in a managed
care environment.23 The physician-patient relationship has been
described in a variety of ways, but a common theme of many of
these descriptions is the requirement that physicians subordinate
their own interests to the interests of their patients. Pellegrino de-
scribes this as a requirement that physicians be self-effacing; 4
23. See M. Gregg Bloche, Clinical Loyalties and the Social Purposes of Medicine, 281 JAMA
268, 268 (1999) (arguing that the conflict between "loyalty to patients" and physicians' social
responsibilities has not been managed adequately, "because they either deny or unsuccess-
fully finesse the reality of contradiction between fidelity to patients and society's other
expectations of medicine" and concluding that the "reality needs to be more squarely ac-
knowledged").
24. See EDWARD D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S GOOD:
THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE 174 (1988) ("Indeed, it is this efface-
ment of self-interest that distinguishes a true profession from a business or craft. And it is
SUMMER 1999]
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others describe this as a fiduciary relationship. 25A fiduciary rela-
tionship means that patients have a right to expect that physicians
will not only look after the interests of patients, but also will work
positively for the good of patients.
26
Integral to the concept of a fiduciary relationship are the posi-
tive duties that physicians owe their patients. Among these are a
duty to respect the autonomy of patients, a duty to advocate for
their patients, and a duty to create an atmosphere that will foster
trusting relationships.
A. Duty to Respect Autonomy
Physicians have a positive duty to respect the autonomy of their
patients. 27 This duty derives from the duty to respect patients as
persons of unconditional worth who have the capacity to deter-
mine their own goals. The duty reflects that patients are ends in
the expectation that physicians will, by and large, practice some degree of self-effacement
that warrants the trust that society and individual patients place in them.").
25. See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY & MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST 210, 211 (1993) [hereinafter RODWIN, MEDICINE] ("Physicians often act as tradi-
tional fiduciaries and espouse a fiduciary ethic. In a few situations, courts apply fiduciary law
principles to doctors. But aside from these limited circumstances, physicians-as clinicians-
are not held to fiduciary standards, especially with respect to financial conflicts of interest.").
However, Rodwin believes that it is "important to develop financial practice standards that
will preserve physicians' fidelity to patients." Id.
26. Marc Rodwin describes fiduciaries as follows:
A fiduciary is a person who has power over the affairs of another party and who is re-
quired by law to act on that person's behalf. The law holds fiduciaries to the highest
standards of conduct. Fiduciaries are expected to be loyal to those for whom they act
and, in exercising discretion and independent judgment, to act for their exclusive
benefit. The law explicitly defines some relations as fiduciary, including the trustee-
beneficiary relation, the lawyer-client relation, the corporate officer-shareholder
relation, relations among partners, and the public servant in relation to the public.
The law has held that physicians, nurses, and medical care institutions are fiduciaries
for patients, but only in limited contexts. Still, it is generally believed that medical
personnel should act as fiduciaries for patients.
Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 604, 604 (1995); see also
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 430 (4th ed.
1994) (arguing that "[t]he patient-physician relationship is a fiduciary relationship-that is,
founded on trust or confidence; and the physician is therefore necessarily a trustee for the
patient's medical welfare.").
27. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 26, at 126 (stating the negative proposi-
tion that "[a]utonomous actions should not be subjected to controlling constraints by
others").
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themselves and must not be used as means to someone else's end. 8
The duty to respect autonomy spawns several correlative duties:
veracity, confidentiality, and informed consent. It even extends to
the idea that patients should be treated as partners and that physi-
cians and patients ought to share medical decision making.
However, there is no duty to do everything that the patient wants.
Physicians are moral agents, not syringes for hire, and as such,
must make moral judgments about whether to agree to a patient's
request.
B. Duty of Advocacy
Few would argue against the notion that traditional ethics re-
quires physicians to advocate for their patients;2 however, just what
this duty of advocacy requires remains unclear. Advocacy may be
viewed as a manifestation of the more general concept of fidelity to
patients. The AMA Code 8.13 Managed Cares° states: "The duty of
patient advocacy is a fundamental element of the physician-patient
relationship that should not be altered by the system of health care
delivery in which physicians practice. Physicians must continue to
place the interests of their patients first."
3
In order to answer the question of what the duty of advocacy re-
quires, I will first explore the traditional limits of advocacy and
then the limits of advocacy within managed care.
1. Traditional Limits of Advocacy-Even though traditional ethics
require physicians to advocate for their patients, the requirements
of advocacy have always had limits. 32 These limits place the good of
society above the good of the patient in certain circumstances.
First, advocacy is limited by law. Regardless of patients' wishes, the
law requires physicians to report certain communicable diseases,
28. This is a rephrasing of Immanuel Kant as referenced in Beauchamp & Childress,
see id. at 125.
29. The duty of advocacy can also be derived from the principle of beneficence, a
commitment to the patient's good. "Beneficence means acting on behalf of, in the interest
of, or as an advocate of the patient." Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics
of Medical Gatekeeping, 2J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 25 (1986).
30. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 126 (1996-97 ed.)
[hereinafter COUNCIL ON ETHICAL ANDJUDICIAL AFFAIRS].
31. Id.
32. See American College of Physicians, Ethics Manual, Fourth Edition, 128 ANNALS IN-
TERNAL MED. 576, 588 (1998) [hereinafter Ethics Manual, 4th ed.].
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many of which are sexually transmitted, to public health authori-
ties. Physicians also have a duty to warn identifiable third parties.
Second, physicians themselves have limited advocacy based on
medical standards of care. For example, frequency of screening
tests such as pap smears and mammograms are based on national
recommendations which take into account the cost of finding a
disease and saving a life. Pap smears are recommended only every
three years for low risk patients and yearly for higher risk patients.
But why not every year for everyone, or every six months? If the
cytology lab misses the diagnosis, a repeat test in six months, in-
stead of three years, may have profoundly different consequences.
Also, consider the recommendation that yearly mammography be
offered only to women over forty. Breast cancer occurs in women
under forty years of age.
Medical standards of care also dictate how complete an exam a
physician is likely to perform. For example, patients who see their
ophthalmologist for frequent contact lens checks do not get a fun-
duscopic exam at each visit, even though such an exam might
uncover a serious retinal problem that might have a better progno-
sis if treated early. Medical standards of care also dictate the
routine for vaccination practices that may put the individual pa-
tient at risk, more for the benefit of the population than for their
own benefit.3 4 For example, when a large portion of the population
has been vaccinated, the prevalence of the disease decreases to
such low levels that the risk of an unvaccinated patient contracting
the disease may be lower than the risk of a side effect of the vacci-
nation. Yet, until the disease is completely eradicated from the
world (like small pox), physicians continue to recommend vaccina-
tions so that the rate of immunity remains high in the population.
They are not recommending the vaccination to protect the indi-
vidual patient from the disease. Of course, if all physicians stopped
vaccinating their patients whenever the rate of immunity was high
and the risk of disease low, the number of immune patients would
fall and the population, including their individual patients, would
be put at risk.
33. See Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 463 (1976) (holding
that once psychotherapist discovered that patient posed a risk of danger to others, psycho-
therapist had a duty to warn intended victims). This case is often cited in the bioethics
literature as the source of the legal duty to warn identifiable third parties at risk.
34. See Bloche, supra note 23, at 268. In addition to immunization practices, Bloche
provides another example: "choosing antibiotics with an eye toward slowing the evolution of
resistant bacterial strains" rather than choosing the most effective antibiotic for the patient.
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Third, advocacy has often been limited by physicians' sense of
good stewardship.5 Even in a fee-for-service environment, physi-
cians resist patients who insist on, for example, an MRI for an
obvious tension headache. 3 Furthermore, physicians generally ref-
use to certify as disabled a patient they feel is malingering. In the
transplant arena, physicians often refuse to give scarce organs to
patients who are not likely to live very long even with the trans-
plant.37  Thus, even within the traditional physician-patient
relationship, physicians in certain circumstances place the good of
society before the good of the patient.
2. Advocacy in Managed Car8---Given these traditional limits on
advocacy within the general fee-for-service environment, how far
should physicians go within a managed care environment to advo-
cate for their patients? Should physicians game the system? Should
they help patients get care to which they are not entitled? Should
they exaggerate symptoms so that their patients will meet a thresh-
old necessary for reimbursement? For example, a forty-year-old
man wants an exercise stress electrocardiogram because his older
brother recently had a heart attack. His HMO will not pay for ex-
ercise stress tests unless the patient has angina or has recently had
an infarct. The patient's only symptom is dyspepsia (acid indiges-
tion) that has improved markedly after taking medication that
35. See Ethics Manual, 4th ed., supra note 32, at 586 ("Physicians should also contribute
to the responsible stewardship of health care resources .... Parsimonious care that utilizes
the most efficient means to diagnose a condition and treat a patient respects the need to use
resources wisely and to help ensure that resources are equitably available.").
36. There is another reason for refusing to order tests on very low risk patients: a posi-
tive finding may be more likely due to a false positive test result than to the discovery of real
disease. False positive findings may lead to more invasive testing or even to treatment, both
of which may carry substantial risk.
37. See generally Benjamin et al., supra note 21 (examining the fair and efficient princi-
ples developed by the transplantation system to rationally allocate the limited supply of
organs).
38. Advocacy has been described as follows: "[t]he physician has a moral and ethical
duty to act as an advocate for the patient when needed care is denied." James T.C. Li, The
Physician as Advocate, 73 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1022, 1022 (1998).
But physicians who advocate for their patients within managed care may lose their jobs.
See Brian McCormick, What Price Patient Advocacy?, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 28, 1994, at 1
(reporting allegations of such conduct). In addition, the Ethics Manual of the American
College of Physicians states:
The physician's first and primary duty is to the patient .... Whether financial incen-
tives in the fee-for-service system prompt physicians to do more rather than less or
managed care arrangements encourage the physician to do less rather than more,
physicians must not allow such considerations to affect their clinical judgment or
counseling on treatment options, including referrals, for the patient.
Ethics Manual, 4th ed., supra note 32, at 586.
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inhibits acid production in the stomach. The physician, sympa-
thetic regarding the patient's anxiety, orders the stress test,
indicating: "chest pain, rule out angina."
This patient's request is reasonable. He is understandably anx-
ious due to his brother's acute illness, and he worries that the same
fate will befall him. Nevertheless, physicians ought to work within
the system by requesting an exception to the rules and perhaps
even appealing the decision if the exception is denied. Physicians
who agree to work in MCOs should agree to follow the rules. If
they believe that the organization acts unfairly, they can work to
change it or they can leave, but they ought not deceive. Patients
may be pleased if their physicians game the system, but in the
process patients learn that their physicians are dishonest and per-
haps should not be trusted.
Within the rules of the system, how far should physicians go to
advocate for their patients? Should physicians fight for everything
that may be of benefit and that the patient wants, regardless of how
small the benefit or how large the cost? If every physician success-
fully did this for every patient, the cost of health care would
become so enormous that other important social goods would have
to be forgone. Consequently, provision of such services would
place physicians in direct conflict with their social obligations.
Some of the social obligations of physicians were discussed
above:39 reporting duties imposed by law (usually regarding issues
of public health), a duty to warn identifiable third parties, and less
well defined notions of good stewardship. Without making a for-
mal argument, I believe that physicians have a responsibility to be
good stewards of our resources. Physicians regularly assume this
responsibility during situations of scarcity or limited supply. For
example, when physicians allocate solid organs for transplantation,
they consider how long a patient is likely to survive with the trans-
planted organ. Also, when blood supply is low or when intensive
care unit beds are in short supply, physicians consider the needs of
other patients, not just their own patients. Finally, physicians ad-
vance several arguments for limiting treatment on the basis of
futility. Ultimately, this position has a social basis. When the likeli-
hood of achieving a particular outcome becomes too remote,
physicians argue that expensive societal resources should not be
spent trying to achieve this unlikely outcome. Physicians have an
implicit obligation to society to provide medical care without bank-
rupting society.
39. See supra Part III.B. 1.
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In practice, likely because of a sense of good stewardship, most
physicians do not provide their patients with everything that may
be of benefit and that the patient wants, regardless of how small
the benefit or how large the cost. I will now attempt to better de-
fine a sub-group of these services that I will call marginally
beneficial services. They are characterized by the following: The
maximum likely benefit that these services can achieve and the
probability of achieving this maximal benefit are not balanced by
the burden (expense, pain, suffering or risk of further harm).
Thus, marginally beneficial services represent a problem of pro-
portionality. Whenever we make a decision, medical or not, we
balance the benefits and burdens of our choice. If we are consider-
ing buying a new car, we balance what benefits us (appearance,
comfort, reliability, safety, or handling) against what burdens us
(higher monthly payments, higher insurance premiums, or higher
personal property taxes). Other burdens might include what we
would have to give up (a vacation, dinners out) in order to pay for
the new car. We may make bad decisions, but no rational person
deliberately chooses greater burdens than benefits.
In health care, patients likewise make choices based on net
benefit, but they sometimes choose marginally beneficial services,
because the patients do not have to bear the expense (burden) 40 of
these services, so they only see the benefit. The burden is out of
sight and out of mind. Of course, the burden still exists. It is borne
by the payers, the insurance company or the MCO. They in turn
pass this expense (burden) on to their subscribers. Viewed from
the narrow perspective of the patient, marginally beneficial services
may be proportionate (they provide net benefit to the patient), but
when viewed from the larger societal perspective, they are dispro-
portionate, that is, they are expensive, and they provide only
marginal benefit (considering all the burdens, including cost, they
do not provide a net benefit). Choices may be socially dispropor-
tionate, even if they are not expensive, where the cost combined
with other burdens far exceeds the limited benefit combined with
the small likelihood of achieving that benefit.
For example, consider a patient with signs and symptoms of a
tension headache who insists on an MRI. The benefits to the pa-
tient are anxiety reduction (likely) and discovery of a brain tumor
or other serious brain pathology that can be more easily treated if
discovered early (unlikely). The burdens are the cost (very expen-
sive), and the risk of finding an artifact that will increase anxiety
40. There may be other burdens beside cost, such as pain, risk of harm, or even risk of
death.
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and lead to further testing (more likely than finding a treatable
brain tumor). The test itself is non-invasive and thus causes mini-
mal patient discomfort.4' If the patient had to pay for this test out
of pocket, then his desire to relieve his anxiety would be balanced
against the cost of the test. If most patients of modest means would
find the cost too high relative to the benefit of anxiety relief, then
provision of this care would be socially disproportionate, and by my
definition would be a marginally beneficial service.
The following are some other examples of marginally beneficial
services:
42
* Weekly office visits for a patient with stable chronic
renal failure.
* Referral of a thirty year old man with panic attacks
to a cardiologist.
* Referral of an asymptomatic young woman to an
Ob/Gyn specialist for routine pap and pelvic exam
when her primary care physician could easily per-
43form the exam.
* A chest x-ray for a patient with bronchitis who is
otherwise healthy.
I can now restate the question about how far physicians should
go to advocate for their patients. Should physicians provide serv-
ices that are marginally beneficial/socially disproportionate
(services that do not provide net benefit when all the burdens-
including cost that is not borne by the patient-are considered), or
does their duty within the physician-patient relationship prohibit
even this limited social view? To answer this question, I need to ask
yet another question: Is it fair for patients to demand socially dis-
proportionate care? The proportionality argument implies that
patients would not choose socially disproportionate care if they
had to endure the burden themselves. If this is so, and if the pa-
tient were of average means, then it would be unfair to insist that
41. Some patients who are claustrophobic find the procedure intolerable.
42. Physicians viewing this list can always envision some exception to the examples, but
that should not detract from their overall usefulness to illustrate what I mean by marginally
beneficial services.
43. I realize that this is a sensitive issue with many female patients. In fact, their de-
mand to have routine gynecologic care performed by their Ob/Gyn physician has forced the
inclusion of Ob/Gyn physicians into the category of primary care physician, a role for which
they have no special training. Nevertheless, these referrals are properly labeled marginally
beneficial services unless the patients are willing to spend out of pocket the increased cost
incurred to the plan.
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society pay for these services.44 This conclusion is rooted in formal
theories of justice that are beyond the scope of this paper. I argue
here only that it is a reasonable conclusion based on the straight-
forward notion ofjustice as fairness.
Another way of trying to answer the question about whether it is
fair for patients to demand marginally effective/socially dispropor-
tionate care would be to look at stewardship. Patients as well as
physicians have a responsibility as members of a larger society to
practice good stewardship, to make the best use of the available
resources. This is analogous to our responsibility to protect our
environment. It is an ecological argument.45 No one should be
permitted to disproportionately use (abuse) our environment or to
disproportionately use our social resources. Therefore, from a
stewardship perspective as well as a rational choice perspective, it is
unfair for patients to insist on socially disproportionate care. If it is
unfair for patients to insist on socially disproportionate care, then
it is hard to imagine how the ethics of the physician-patient rela-
tionship would compel physicians to advocate for this care. Thus
another limit on patient advocacy is the provision of marginally
effective/socially disproportionate care. Put another way, rationing
marginally effective care does not violate traditional ethics. There
is a positive duty, based on fairness and stewardship, for physicians
to avoid providing marginally beneficial services.
C. Duty to Foster Trust
This Article has reviewed two positive duties that physicians owe
their patients: the duty to respect the autonomy of patients and the
duty to advocate for patients. The Article will now review the third
44. This analysis works only if the patient can afford the services and would purchase
them if they provided more benefit. If the cost is so high or if the patient is so poor that the
patient simply cannot afford the service no matter how great the benefit, then the propor-
tionality and fairness analysis breaks down.
45. For a discussion of the ecological metaphor, see George J. Annas, Refraining the De-
bate on Health Care Reform by Replacing Our Metaphors, 332 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 744, 746-47
(1995); see generally Special Supplement, Nature, Polis, Ethics, 28 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Nov.-Dec. 1998, at Si.
46. While not addressing the specific issue of marginally effective care, the AMA
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs did stipulate the following: "[r]egardless of any allo-
cation guidelines or gatekeeper directives, physicians must advocate for any care they believe
will materially benefit their patients." Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American
Medical Association, Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330, 334 (1995). Unfortu-
nately, the Council did not define "materially benefit," so it is not clear to me whether this
includes marginally effective care.
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and final duty, the duty to create an atmosphere that will foster a
trusting relationship.
Despite the desire for shared decision-making and the need to
respect patient autonomy, the physician-patient relationship is un-
balanced: physicians have knowledge while patients are ignorant;
physicians have power and strength while patients are in need and
are often ill.47 Consequently, patients must trust their physicians.
Patients trust that physicians have the knowledge and the necessary
skills (competency), and they trust that physicians will apply that
knowledge and those skills to benefit patients (patients' interests
first). Furthermore, patients trust that what they tell their physi-
cians will be kept confidential, and that physicians will be there
when needed. Unfortunately, however, patients' trust. of their phy-
sicians is being eroded by financial conflicts of interest,48 and by
patients' perception of the increasing powerlessness of physicians.
This Part will first discuss the problem of conflicts of interest and
then discuss the problem of physician powerlessness.
1. Conflicts of Interest: Trust-Trust is important in the physician-
patient relationship. 49 It is therapeutic (perhaps through a placebo
effect) and it relieves anxiety. Reassurance that the patient's
symptoms are minor and do not portend serious disease is a
common goal of many physician-patient encounters. For example,
let us return to the earlier example of the forty-year-old man whose
brother recently had a myocardial infarct and who is anxious about
the possibility that he too has coronary artery disease. He comes to
the office demanding an exercise stress test, but what he really
wants is to be reassured that he is healthy. After a careful history,
physical examination, routine laboratory tests, and a successful trial
of medication that inhibits acid production, the physician
concludes that the patient does not have symptoms of coronary
47. See Ethics Manual, 4th ed., supra note 32, at 577 ("The patient-physician relationship
entails special obligations for the physician to serve the patient's interest because of the
specialized knowledge that physicians hold and the imbalance of power between physicians
and patients. The physician's primary commitment must always be to the patient's welfare
and best interests. . ").
48. For an in-depth survey of the prevalence and effects of financial incentives on pri-
mary care physicians, see generally Kevin Grumbach et al., Primary Care Physicians' Experience
of Financial Incentives in Managed-Care Systems, 339 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1516 (1998).
49. See Audiey C. Kao et al., The Relationship Between Method of Physician Payment and Pa-
tient Trust, 280 JAMA 1708, 1708 (1998) ("More fee-for-service (FFS) indemnity patients
(94%) completely or mostly trust their physicians to 'put their health and well-being above
keeping down the health plan's costs' than salary (77%), capitated (83%), or FFS managed
care patients (85%) ... ."). But see Alan L. Hillman, Mediators of Patient Trust, 280 JAMA
1703, 1704 (1998) (suggesting FFS patients' ability to choose may result in selection bias as
they "likely shop until they find a physician they trust; that is, they self-select into a system
and chose a 'trustworthy' physician .... ).
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artery disease, and despite the strong family history is at low risk for
asymptomatic coronary artery disease. If the physician and patient
have a trusting relationship, then the patient will likely accept the
reassurance from his physician and drop his request for an exercise
stress test. However, if the patient perceives that the physician is a
gatekeeper who achieves a secondary financial gain through not
recommending the expensive exercise stress test, the patient may
not be convinced that the exercise stress test is unnecessary. This
illustrates one of the problems of conflicts of interests: they erode
trust.
2. Conflicts of Interest: Judgment-Conflicts of interest not only
erode trust, they also impair physician judgment. Physicians and
other professionals often believe that they are immune to the per-
nicious effects of conflicts of interest, and so speak of "potential"
conflicts of interest.50 This is a redundant phrase because conflicts
of interest are themselves potentially pernicious behavior: breaches
of obligation. 5'1 Thus, conflicts of interest ought to be avoided,
whenever possible, because they have the potential to lead to a
breach of obligation, and they ought to be avoided for another
reason: they subtly influence judgment.12
To illustrate this, let us return once again to the anxious forty
year old who wants an exercise stress test. The physician made a
judgment about the patient's risk for asymptomatic coronary artery
disease and about the value of getting the desired exercise stress
test. In her evaluation of this patient, there was no single test and
no single physical finding that conclusively excluded the presence
of asymptomatic coronary artery disease. All the data taken to-
gether allowed the physician to make the judgment. The decision-
making process was judgmental; it was not a process of assigning
numbers to each piece of data and then adding them all up to see
if they exceeded some threshold that would make the exercise
stress test necessary. Very little decision-making in medicine works
that objectively. Most decisions are judgment calls involving the
physician's experience, the data, and often a gestalt as to what is
the best course to follow. Most decisions are made in the gray area,
few are black or white. Physicians, like all professionals, are human
beings, well trained but still prone to outside influences. Very few
physicians would deliberately withhold treatment in a clear black
and white situation, but most physicians, despite their claims to the
contrary, are influenced in subtle ways as they make countless
50. See RODWIN, MEDICINE, supra note 25, at 9.
51. See id.
52. See id.
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medical decisions in the gray area. If this patient presented with
symptoms more suggestive of angina and if his laboratory data
showed a high cholesterol level and if he were a heavy smoker,
then few physicians would say no to his request, despite conflicting
financial interests. However, if the situation were less clear, if the
patient had no chest pain, if his cholesterol were only slightly ele-
vated, and if he smoked only a half pack of cigarettes per day, then
the physician would have a difficult decision to make. If on top of
all that, the physician's contract with the HMO was such that she
would have to pay for the test out of her own pocket, then her
judgment might be influenced to deny the patient's request even if
during the entire decision making process the physician never con-
sciously thought about the fact that she would lose income by
ordering this test. Conflicts of interest insidiously influence deci-
sion-making. In fact, that is why MCOs create financial conflicts of
interest (financial incentives). They want to influence physicians to
53spend less money on health care.
3. Conflicts of Interest: Differences in Fee-for-Service-Proponents of
financial incentives in managed care try to counter these objec-
tions by pointing out that conflicts of interest also exist in fee-for-
service arrangements in which physicians get paid more for doing
more. This is certainly true, but there are important differences.
First, patients can always say no or they can get a second opinion if
they are unsure whether to follow the advice given. However, if pa-
tients are not offered a certain treatment that they otherwise would
not have known existed, they would have no recourse.54
Second, in a fee-for-service or indemnity insurance environ-
ment, conflicts of interest are not encouraged as they are in
managed care.55 In fact, they are discouraged. For example, there
53. See Alan L. Hillman, Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMOs: Is There a Conflict?,
317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1743, 1743 (1987) [hereinafter Hillman, Financial Incentives]
("Certain financial incentives, especially when used in combination, suggest conflicts of
interest that may influence physicians' behavior and adversely affect the quality of care.").
54. Beauchamp and Childress emphasize this distinction:
The patient is in a very different position when the physician has incentives to restrict
needed treatment than when the physician has incentives to provide unnecessary
treatment. In the latter situation, patients can obtain another opinion. In the former
situation, patients may never be aware of a needed treatment because no one has
recommended it.
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 26, at 439.
55. See RODWIN, MEDICINE, supra note 25, at 153 (arguing that "[bly using financial in-
centives to change the clinical practice of physicians, society calls forth self-interested
behavior. In asking physicians to consider their own interest in deciding how to act, we alter
the attitude we want physicians ideally to have"). The American College of Physicians, Ethics
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are peer review panels that reprimand physicians who are sus-
pected of performing unnecessary surgery.56 Also, the AMA Code
578.03 Conflicts of Interest Guidelines state:
Under no circumstances may physicians place their own fi-
nancial interests above the welfare of their patients. The
primary objective of the medical profession is to render serv-
ice to humanity; reward or financial gain is a subordinate
consideration. For a physician unnecessarily to hospitalize a
patient, prescribe a drug, or conduct diagnostic tests for the
physician's financial benefit is unethical. If a conflict develops
between the physician's financial interest and the physician's
responsibilities to the patient, the conflict must be resolved to
the patient's benefit.5
Unfortunately, organized medicine, specifically the AMA, has in
the past not done enough to discourage entrepreneurship among
its members.9 It took legislation sponsored by Representative Pete
Manual-Third Edition, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 947, 951-52 (1992), makes a series of
comments with respect to conflicts of interest which may be summarized as follows:
A. The welfare of the patient must at all times be paramount.
B. Trust in the profession is undermined when there is even the appear-
ance of impropriety.
C. Physicians must be conscious of all potential influences.
D. Physicians should avoid any business arrangement that might lead to
personal gain which in turn might influence their decisions in the care
of the patient.
E. In general, physicians should not refer patients to an outside facility in
which they have invested and at which they do not directly provide care
or services.
See id.; see also PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 24, at 174 ("While there has always been
some irreducible quantum of self-interest in medicine, rarely, if ever, has self-interest been
socially sanctioned, morally legitimated, or encouraged as it is in the rationing approach to
cost containment.").
56. Also, in a medical malpractice suit in which there is an adverse event, a physician
would not want to be additionally accused of performing an unnecessary procedure.
57. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 105 (1996-97 ed.).
58. Id.
59. See Arnold S. Relman, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 749,
751 (1985). Relman notes:
The AMA's present position has an even more troublesome aspect. In admitting that
business deals create conflicts of interest for physicians, but arguing that we need be
concerned only about arrangements that demonstrably lead to bad practice, the
AMA's statements ignore the damage done to the public trust in the medical profes-
sion by even the appearance of conflicts of interest.
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Stark (D-California) to call attention to the fact that physicians who
have ownership in a health care facility tend to over-utilize that fa-
cility, and that referral of patients to these facilities represents an
unacceptable conflict of interest.6°
A dramatic example of how physicians over-utilize expensive
equipment that they own comes from a study by Hillman and col-
leagues. 1 They found that physicians who used imaging equipment
in their offices obtained imaging examinations four to four and a
half times more often than physicians who always referred patients
to radiologists. 2 Also, for some of the studies, the physicians who
used imaging equipment in their offices charged significantly more
than the radiologists.63
Fee-splitting is another example of a conflict of interest that is
deemed unethical. 64 Fee-splitting creates a conflict of interest be-
Id.; see also Arnold S. Relman, Editor's Reply, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 252, 252 (1986). Relman
further notes:
I agree with Dr. Todd and the AMA leadership that an ethical canon against conflicts
of interest would not of itself make ethical physicians more ethical, nor would it deter
the unethical. It would, however, be a beacon to guide the many physicians who are
confused and uncertain about this question, and it would have a powerfully salutary
effect on the public's esteem for our profession.
Id. But see Ethics Manual, 4th ed., supra note 32, at 587 ("Physicians should not refer patients
to an outside facility in which they have invested and at which they do not directly provide
care.").
60. Stark proposed legislation to eliminate virtually all physician self-referral of Medi-
care patients, but his legislation was opposed by the AMA and many other medical societies.
See RODWIN, MEDICINE, supra note 25, at 127. The compromise law was limited to prohibit-
ing physicians from referring Medicare patients to clinical laboratories in which physicians
had a financial interest. See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§ 6204, 103 Stat. 2136 (adding section 1877 to Title 18 of the Social Security Act).
61. See Bruce J. Hillman et al., Frequency and Costs of Diagnostic Imaging in Office
Practice-A Comparison of Self-Referring and Radiologist-Referring Physicians, 323 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1604, 1606-08 (1990) [hereinafter Hillman, Frequency and Costs]; see also John K.
Iglehart, Health Policy Report: The Debate over Physician Ownership of Health Care Facilities, 321
NEw ENG. J. MED. 198, 201-02 (1989); Jean M. Mitchell & Jonathan H. Sunshine,
Consequences of Physicians' Ownership of Health Care Facilities-Joint Ventures in Radiation Therapy,
327 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1497, 1497 (1992). Mitchell and Sunshine found:
The frequency and costs of radiation-therapy treatments at free-standing centers were
40 to 60 percent higher in Florida than in the rest of the United States; there was no
below-average use of radiation therapy at hospitals or higher cancer rates that ex-
plained the higher rates of use or higher costs in Florida.
Id.
62. See Hillman, Frequency and Costs, supra note 61, at 1606.
63. See id.
64. See Ethics Manual, 4th ed., supra note 32, at 587. The American College of Physicians
advocates this position:
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cause physicians may refer patients to the physicians who give the
biggest kickback, instead of to the physicians who are most capa-
ble. Some commentators claim that giving physicians money to
spend less on their patient's health care is analogous to giving kick-
backs to the referring physicians. 5
Third, in fee-for-service, the incentive to do more is limited by
the physician's available time. There is little incentive to do an un-
necessary procedure if a busy physician would have difficulty
finding the time to do it. On the other hand, in a managed care
environment there is no limit to the gain physicians may receive by
doing less, because the less they do the more money they get, and
because doing less is not limited by the length of the day.66 Couple
this with the fact that physician's salaries have been squeezed and
that many physicians are struggling to stay even by increasing their
work load,67 and one has a situation ripe for serious conflicts of in-
terest. Of course, this argument does not hold up for physicians
who are having trouble getting their practice going. As a former
editor of the New England Journal of Medicine points out, tradi-
tionally, "[p]hysicians were not impervious to economic pressures,
but the pressures were relatively weak and the tradition of profes-
sionalism was relatively strong., 68 Unfortunately, the traditional
ethos is changing 69 and at the same time the economic pressures
are increasing.76
Fourth, there is a difference in the degree of incentives. A com-
mon practice in MCOs is to withhold a percentage of the
physician's gross income for a period of time (quarterly or yearly)
and then distribute that income based on whether spending tar-
gets have been met. A twenty percent withhold is not uncommon
A fee paid to one physician by another for the referral of a patient, historically known
as fee-splitting, is unethical. It is also unethical for a physician to receive a commis-
sion or a kickback from anyone, including a company that manufactures or sells
medical instruments or medications that are used in the care of the physician's pa-
tients.
Id.
65. See Steffie Woolhandler & David Himmelstein, Extreme Risk-The New Corporate
Proposition for Physicians, 333 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1706, 1706 (1995).
66. In managed care, the financial incentive is to spend less, not just to do less. Actu-
ally, in some circumstances, a gatekeeper may have to do more in order to avoid costly
referrals or costly diagnostic procedures. This fact, however, does not negate the overall
argument.
67. See Sox, supra note 20, at 11.
68. Arnold Relman, What Market Values Are Doing to Medicine, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1992, at 99, 101.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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and this amounts to $60,000 to $70,000 for most gatekeepers. 71 It is
hard to imagine any physician doing so much unnecessary care
that he could generate an additional $60,000 of gross income, and
yet this is not the biggest incentive in managed care. The biggest
incentive, or more correctly, the biggest "stick" in managed care is
job security. Because physicians typically sign one year contracts,
physicians can be deselected, a euphemism for being fired by non-
renewal of contract without cause.72 Once a physician is deselected
from one HMO, he will find it very difficult to be accepted by an-
other HMO. This is especially problematic in areas in which there
is high managed care penetration. The threat of deselection hangs
over every physician in managed care, and it effectively serves to
keep physicians in line. This form of control not only keeps physi-
cian spending down, but it also has a chilling effect on a
physician's willingness to advocate for his patient by appealing ad-
verse decisions. There is no analogy to this in the fee-for-service
environment. Attempts to mandate due process when deselecting
physicians have been met with stiff opposition by the managed care
industry.
4. Conflicts of Interest: Disclosure-Some commentators have pro-
posed that disclosure of these conflicts of interest will be sufficient
to protect patients and preserve or restore their trust. 73 Unfortu-
nately, disclosure is an insufficient remedy. 4 First, patients may not
71. See, e.g., Letter from Steffie Woolhandler and David Himmelstein, 340 NEw ENG.J.
MED. 321, 322 (1999) (pointing out that, "[flor the average internist in 1995, a 'withhold' of
20 percent of gross practice income would have amounted to $77,200-41.6 percent of net
income (after practice expenses)").
In Hillman's survey of HMOs, he found that the most frequent withholding rate was 11%
to 20%, and that 30% of HMOs place primary care physicians at financial risk beyond the
withhold rate. See Hillman, Financial Incentives, supra note 53, at 1745; see also Grumbach et
al., supra note 48, at 1520 (reporting on a survey of nearly 1,000 physicians that states "[o]f
physicians whose managed-care program include bonuses and who reported both the
amount of the bonus they earned and the additional amount that was at risk but not earned,
13 percent reported that the total amount of income at risk was more than $40,000"); Hall,
Rationing Health Care, supra note 10, at 773-74; Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 65,
at 1706 ("One secret to this success is a payment formula that binds primary care physicians'
interest to the firm's. The base capitation payment barely covers office overhead. An inter-
nist with 1500 of the plan's patients might take home more than $150,000 from bonuses and
incentives, or nearly nothing.").
72. See generally Ken Terry, When Health Plans Don't Want You Anymore, MED. ECON., May
23, 1994, at 138.
73. See RODWIN, MEDICINE, supra note 25, at 213; Douglas F. Levinson, Toward Full Dis-
closure of Referral Restrictions and Financial Incentives by Prepaid Health Plans, 317 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1729 (1987); E. Haavi Morreim, Conflicts of Interest: Profits and Problems in Physician Refer-
rals, 262 JAMA 390 (1989); The Royal College of Physicians, The Relationship Between
Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 20 J. ROYAL C. PHYSICIANS LONDON 235 (1986);
Brian McCormick, Referral Ban Softened, Am. MED. NEws,July 6, 1992, at 1.
74. See RODWIN, MEDICINE, supra note 25, at 213.
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understand or may be too dependent on the good will of their
physicians to act on the information, or their judgments may be
clouded because of the emotional and physical effects of their ill-
ness.75 Second, patients may not have meaningful options. Many
patients in MCOs have no alternatives because their employers of-
fer only one plan. 6 Even if patients fully understand the financial
incentives of their physician, their only choice is no insurance at
all. Third, disclosure alerts the patient to the risk of physician dis-
loyalty.7' Imagine a sign in your physician's waiting room that
reads:
Warning: While I will strive to provide you with optimal care,
you need to understand that a significant amount of my in-
come is dependent on saving money for your health
insurance company.
Fourth, disclosure does not alter the influence that a conflict of
interest can have on decision making in the gray area.78 Because of
this, the Stark Amendments prohibit referrals of Medicare patients
to health care facilities in which physicians have a financial inter-
est.
79
Although disclosure is an insufficient remedy, conflicts of inter-
est must be disclosed. 80 The duty to respect patient autonomy and
the correlative duty of informed consent demand disclosure.
HMOs make these disclosures to patients in the written material
distributed to patients at the time of enrollment, but they usually
bury this information within a stack of information, and it is usually
vague enough that patients fail to understand its importance. If the
demand for disclosure comes from the need for obtaining in-
formed consent, then the responsibility for disclosure, like the
responsibility for obtaining informed consent, rests with the physi-
cian.8 ' E. Haavi Morreim reaches the same conclusion using a
slightly different argument:
75. See id. at 214.
76. See id. at 215.
77. See id. at 216.
78. See id. at 215.
79. See id. at 127.
80. See generally Levinson, supra note 73. See also RODWIN, MEDICINE, supra note 25, at
214-15; Ethics Manual, 4th ed., supra note 32, at 579; Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage, Dis-
closing Physician Financial Incentives, 281 JAMA 1424, 1427 (1999) (pointing out that nearly 20
states have created legal mandates requiring MCOs to disclose physician compensation
methods to enrollees).
81. The following outlines a more formal argument for requiring physicians to take re-
sponsibility for informing patients about the financial conflicts of interests:
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A) Premises:
1. Conflicts of interest ought to be avoided whenever possible.
2. When unavoidable, conflicts of interest must be revealed.
3. Conflicts of interest are especially problematic when they are not
expected.
* Patients who visit surgeons in a fee for service setting un-
derstand that the surgeon recommending the procedure
will be paid for her effort.
* However, patients who are referred to a particular sur-
geon by their primary care physician would not expect
their physician to be paid by the surgeon for each refer-
ral.
4. Patients generally believe that physicians act in the best interest
of their patients.
5. The moral requirement for disclosing conflicts of interests
comes from the concept of respect for persons and the principle
of truth telling.
6. The moral requirement for obtaining informed consent comes
from the concept of respect for persons and the principle of
autonomy.
7. Informed consent contains two elements:
" Information: Patients must be informed about the pro-
posed treatment or procedure in such a way that they can
understand the risks and benefits and the alternatives to
treatment.
" Consent: Patients must be capable of making the deci-
sion. They must have the capacity to make the decision
that confronts them, and they must be able to make a free
choice.
8. Physicians are responsible for making certain that patients have
been properly informed, are capable of deciding, and have given
consent. Physician responsibility in this regard is not mitigated
by forms that patients may be required to sign.
9. Disclosure of conflicts of interest are part of the informed con-
sent process.
10. In the managed care setting, primary care physicians may liter-
ally have to pay out of their own pocket for any referrals that
they make to specialists or for special procedures. This is prob-
lematic for two reasons:
* The patient is often unaware of this conflict, because it is
contrary to the fee-for-service plan that most patients are
accustomed to.
* If the potential benefit of a referral does not come up in
conversation between the patient and his physician, then
the patient may not know enough to even question the
absence of the referral. Contrast this with the fee-for-
service surgeon who suggests an operation. The patient at
least has the opportunity to refuse if he feels the risks ex-
ceed the benefits, if he believes the operation is
unnecessary, or for any other reason such as a belief that
the surgeon only wants to make more money.
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Second, physicians must inform patients about the influences
by which they have agreed to be bound. An HMO may have
the initial responsibility to detail for its subscribers the incen-
tives it places on its physicians. But the physicians in that
HMO have explicitly agreed to be bound by those incentives
... and are obligated to ensure that patients understand these
82
economic factors that can influence their medical care.
Not surprisingly, physicians who work in managed care resist this
requirement. They argue that it is the MCO's duty to inform the
patient, and that physicians do not want the responsibility because
it makes patients even more distrustful of them.83 This is a remark-
able observation of how trust is eroded by conflicts of interest.
Nevertheless, if patients are fearful that their physician is an agent
B) Conclusions:
1. Some financial arrangements that physicians make with man-
aged care plans create a conflict of interest with their patients in
certain situations.
2. These conflicts of interests ought to be disclosed to patients.
3. These conflicts of interests ought to be disclosed in the informa-
tion phase of obtaining informed consent.
4. Since physicians have the responsibility of obtaining informed
consent, physicians have the responsibility of assuring that pa-
tients are aware of this conflict of interest at the time of the
decision-making process. However, this does not necessarily
mean that all patients have to be informed of the conflict of in-
terest each and every time that informed consent is obtained.
5. Physicians cannot assume that patients understand the conflict
of interest just because it is written in the literature that is dis-
tributed to patients at the time they enroll in the plan.
* Whether in fact most patients understand this conflict of
interest at the time they enroll in the plan is empirically
verifiable (a prospective study could be done by question-
ing newly enrolled patients). However, even if 95% of the
patients are found to clearly understand the conflict of
interest at the time they enroll, physicians have a moral
responsibility to ensure that the other 5% are informed of
the conflict of interest. Moreover, there is no guarantee
that even patients who understand the conflict of interest
at the time of enrollment will remember it at the time of
decision-making.
6. Physicians must disclose options for therapy or diagnostic proce-
dures even if they are not available in the plan or are not
covered by the plan.
82. E. HAAVI MoRREiM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF MEDICINE'S
NEW ECONOMICS 112 (1995).
83. This is based on my observation of working in a committee with managed care
physicians discussing the ethical issues in managed care. These physicians so strongly op-
posed this concept that the committee was not able to reach consensus on this issue.
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of the MCO, consider the impact if they began to believe that phy-
sicians are secret agents of the MCOs.
Disclosure also has been problematic for physicians regarding
plan coverage. Should physicians working in an MCO inform pa-
tients of therapeutic options that are not covered by the plan?
4
Consider the case of a basketball player who sustains an injury to
his knee, likely a meniscus tear. He belongs to an HMO whose or-
thopedic surgeons have much less experience with arthroscopic
surgery than other orthopedists in the area who are specialists in
sports medicine.8 5 Should his physician inform the patient about
the possibility that he might have a better outcome if he seeks care
outside the plan from a sports medicine specialist? The three du-
ties of the physician in a traditional physician-patient relationship
discussed in this Part would all demand that the physician inform
the patient of his options.
5. Physician Powerlessness-Trust is eroded not only by conflicts
of interest, but also by patients' perceptions of physician power-
lessness. In our fiduciary model of the traditional physician-patient
relationship, patients expect physicians to work for their good, and
to put patients' interests above their own. When patients' interests
are threatened by insurance companies, the government, or
MCOs, patients expect their physicians to protect them from these
agencies. Patients fear, however, that physicians are powerless to
challenge a nameless administrator who will deny them care when
they most need it.
Patients' perception that physicians are powerless to deal with
MCOs is not groundless. Physicians themselves feel powerless in
84. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL ANDJUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 30, at 144. The Council
discusses the obligations of consent and disclosure:
2-e: Managed care plans must adhere to the requirement of informed consent that
patients be given full disclosure of material information. Full disclosure requires that
managed care plans inform potential subscribers of limitations or restrictions on the
benefits package when they are considering entering the plan.
2-f: Physicians also should continue to promote full disclosure to patients enrolled in
managed care organizations. The physician's obligation to disclose treatment alterna-
tives to patients is not altered by any limitations in the coverage provided by the
patient's managed care plan. Full disclosure includes informing patients of all of
their treatment options, even those that may not be covered under the terms of the
managed care plan. Patients may then determine whether an appeal is appropriate,
or whether they wish to seek care outside the plan for treatment alternatives that are
not covered.
Id.
85. See BERNARD Lo, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS 297
(1995).
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the face of giant MCOs. Despite complaints by obstetricians and
pediatricians that sending women home within twenty-four hours
of delivery places some women and their newborns at risk, MCOs
refused to change their policy.8 6 As a result, conservative physician
groups have taken the extraordinary step ofjoining together to ask
the government to legislate the practice of medicine. These groups
have a history of opposing any government interference in the
practice of medicine, yet the American Medical Association, the
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, and the American
College of Pediatrics have proposed legislation to Congress to ban
"drive through deliveries." 7 Furthermore, physicians throughout
the country are considering joining labor unions so that they will
have collective power to deal with MCOs. ss
6. Duty to Foster Trust: Conclusions-The traditional physician-
patient relationship creates a duty to foster the growth of trust, be-
cause trust is such an important part of the therapeutic process.
Unfortunately, as described above, trust is eroded by physician
conflicts of interest, including the physician's role as gatekeeper8 9
and the perception that physicians are agents of the MCOs. Also,
trust is eroded by the patient's perception that physicians are pow-
erless. Clearly, an important task for physicians working in the
managed care environment is to restore patients' trust in their
physicians.
86. See Christina Kent, Bill Would Put Brakes on Drive-Through Deliveries, AM. MED. NEWS,
Oct. 2, 1995, at 1.
87. See id. at 1, 36, 38.
88. See generally Jerome P. Kassirer, Doctor Discontent, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1543
(1998); Julie Appleby, Doctors Look for Union Label: Physicians Angry About Insurance Rules,
Oversight, Cost Cutting, USA TODAY, July 6, 1999, at B1; Michael Casey The AM Jumps on the
Union Bandwagon, MED. INDUSTRY TODAY, July 1, 1999.
89. See LA PUMA & SCHIEDERMAYER, supra note 3, at 87. La Puma and Schiedermayer
define gatekeeping:
Used by MCOs to coordinate care and contain costs, gatekeeping created early prob-
lems that both physicians and patients continue to face:
(a) Underprescription of services
(b) Uncertain criteria for acceptance and rejection of requested services
requiring approval
(c) Untimely referral of patients
(d) Constrained choice of care
(e) Overutilization of incentives to limit care
(f) Minimal available information about the cost-effectiveness of routine
medical practices.
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IV. CHANGING ETHOS IN MEDICINE
As discussed in Section III, the traditional physician-patient rela-
tionship creates at least three separate duties for physicians:
respect for autonomy, advocacy, and fostering trust. Respect for
autonomy is limited by the moral agency of physicians. Advocacy is
limited by law, by medical standards of care, by physician's sense of
good stewardship, and by fairness, which sets an outer limit of ad-
vocacy at providing marginally beneficial services. Trust is eroded
by conflicts of interest and perceptions of physician powerlessness.
In addition, the risk that conflicts of interest will result in breaches
of obligation is increased by the changing ethos in medicine.
In the past, the traditional physician-patient relationship was
supported by a strong fiduciary ethos. As Brody points out, despite
individual instances of abuse and the conflict of interest created by
the fee-for-service system, "the majority of physicians, most of the
time, made decisions that appeared to them to be in the patient's
best interest ... because of some deeply held professional values
which forced them to put the [patient's interests first.]" 90 Unfortu-
nately, this ethos is changing. Thus, the risks of conflicts of interest
will be greater in the future. At the same time that the changing
ethos is promoting financial conflicts of interest, the changing
ethos is increasing the risk that these conflicts of interest will result
in breach of obligation.
To illustrate this change in ethos, look at the change in lan-
guage:
* Professionalism: entrepreneurialism
" Health care system: health care industry
* Medical practice: competitive business
* Patients: consumers
* Physicians: providers
• Patient's interests first: societal interests first
* Deontological view of the profession: utilitarian view
of the profession. 9'
The best protection that patients have against the conflicts of in-
terest inherent in medical practice is physicians' reaffirmation of
90. Howard Brody, Cost Containment as Professional Challenge, 8 THEORETICAL MED. 5, 8
(1987).
91. See Relman, supra note 68, at 101.
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their professionalism. Physicians must encourage organized medi-
cine to take the lead and prohibit entrepreneurialism. Physicians
must reaffirm that they care for patients, not consumers, that they
practice medicine, not business, and that they work within a health
care system in which they put patients' interests above their own
and properly balance patient's interests and societal interests.
Achieving the proper balance between patients' interests and so-
cietal interests will be discussed next.
92
92. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Interests, Obligations, and Justice: Some Notes Toward an
Ethic of Managed Care, 6J. CLINICAL ETHICS 312, 315-16 (1995). Pellegrino observes:
[T]hese dilemmas are not to be resolved at the bedside by the clinician. They are in
the domain of distributive justice and corporate ethics. The physician must remain
the patient's advocate, not the agent of the managed-care corporation.
Clearly, commutative justice, which should govern the individual physician's obliga-
tions to his or her patient, and distributive justice, which should govern the
physician's obligations to the collectivity, are in conflict.... In addition, whatever
ethic is elaborated must somehow make room for a proper ordering of commutative
and distributive justice to each other. The physician's emphasis as a physician is on
commutative justice, but this cannot exist apart from a more comprehensive ethic of
managed care that would include an ethic of the collective, corporate, and societal
obligations to the care of the sick as well.
On this view, a 'corporate ethic' of managed care should, at a minimum, include the
following ethical components:
First, it should be made clear to all-physicians, patients, and managers-that the
physician's primary responsibility is to the patient with whom she or he has a cove-
nant of trust....
Second, as a corollary of (1), the physician has a moral obligation to use only those
tests, procedures, and treatments that are effective, beneficial, and not excessively
burdensome....
Third, physicians should not enter contracts that include financial incentives or 'gag'
clauses, which prevent full disclosure to patients of why they are denied treatments
the physician believes optimal....
Fourth, physicians should act collectively to resist, and refuse to participate in, plans
that demonstrably produce harm to patients....
Fifth, managed care must have quality of care as its primary aim....
Sixth, investor ownership and profit taking from managed care cannot avoid irrecon-
cilable ethical conflicts. Non-profit, cooperative organizations should be the rule.
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V. BALANCING PATIENTS' INTERESTS WITH SOCIETAL INTERESTS
One of the questions posed in the Introduction to this Article
was: How ought physicians be involved in rationing medical care? I
explored the need for rationing and concluded that the rationing
of health care is inevitable. 9 I also explored the limits of advocacy,
and concluded that physicians need not provide marginally benefi-
cial care.94 This conclusion was based on two arguments: fairness (it
is not fair for patients to demand disproportionate services), and
stewardship (patients and physicians have a responsibility to be
good stewards of our scarce resources). Next, I explored how con-
flicts of interest erode patient trust, and concluded that
entrepreneurship ought to be prohibited and that financial incen-
tives to limit care in managed care are problematic and are not the
flip side of the incentive to do more in a fee-for-service environ-
ment. Finally, I noted how the changing ethos in medicine may
increase the risk that conflicts of interest will result in breaches of
obligation.
The implication from the above review is that conflicts of inter-
est in this changing environment place patients at risk. Does the
need for rationing justify this risk? The AMA Code 8.13 Managed
Care states that "[e]fforts to contain health care costs should not
place patient welfare at risk. Thus, financial incentives are permis-
sible only if they promote the cost-effective delivery of health care
and not the withholding of medically necessary care. ,95
No one would argue with the desire to provide cost-effective
care. In fact, stewardship would demand that, all things being
equal, physicians should provide the least costly alternatives. How-
ever, there is a difference between being a good steward of a scarce
resource and being a profit manager for an MCO.
Current MCO financial incentives are designed to make profits
for MCOs while at the same time keeping costs competitive so that
employers will subscribe to the plan. Yet, MCOs justify their incen-
tive schemes by asserting that the amount of money spent on
health care must be decreased so that society can enjoy other social
goods and so that there will be health care dollars available for
other medical needs (preventive care, the uninsured). This argu-
ment is based on the need for good stewardship; however, the
structure of the financial incentives employed by the MCOs as-
93. See supra Part II.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
95. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL ANDJUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 30, at 144.
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sumes that physicians will not act as responsible stewards, but will
act only to increase their personal incomes.96 This leads us back to
an intolerable conflict of interest. Would it not be better if physi-
cians were judged and rewarded based on the quality of the care
they provided instead of on how much money they saved? This is
not to say that controlling health care costs is not important and
should not be considered by physicians. Physicians ought to con-
sider the cost of care. All things being equal, they ought to use the
least expensive options. Furthermore, as discussed above in Part
III.B, physicians need not provide marginally beneficial services,
and in fact, the provision of quality medical care should not in-
clude such services. 97
A. Bedside Rationing
If one criterion for the provision of quality care is the avoidance
of marginally beneficial services, then good physicians practicing
responsibly would avoid providing marginally beneficial services.
Because good physicians do not need financial incentives to pro-
vide quality care, one may ask what the financial incentives of
MCOs are encouraging physicians to do. Are MCOs encouraging
physicians to do less than what is clearly beneficial? Less than what
is necessary? These rationing activities are termed bedside ration-
ing, and despite the fact that nearly all MCOs employ gatekeepers,
all MCOs deny utilizing bedside rationing. The refrain is: "We do
not encourage physicians to ration medical care, rather we en-
courage physicians to avoid unnecessary care which is costly and
possibly dangerous."9' Bedside rationing is opposed by the codes of
ethics of many-perhaps all-major medical organizations.99 In
96. In fact, under the current incentive plans, physicians are encouraged to act to in-
crease their own personal incomes.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
98. This refrain is my interpretation of a composite view of how MCOs want to be per-
ceived. None want to be perceived as rationing health care, and so no plan description that I
am aware of uses the term "rationing". MCOs want to be seen in a positive light. See, e.g.,
KONGSTVEDT, supra note 2, at 61 ("Under a well-crafted capitation program, you are not
paying physicians to underutilize services; you are sharing the savings of cost-effective care").
99. See COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 30, at 7 (arguing that
"[t]he treating physician must remain a patient advocate and therefore should not make
allocation decisions"). The American College of Physicians promotes two rationing princi-
ples:
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addition, it is nearly universally condemned by medical ethicists,' 0°
although recently there have been a few notable exceptions.'1
Generally, the oversimplified justification of the proponents of
bedside rationing is as follows: given the need for rationing, ration-
ing at the bedside is the least bad alternative. It is better than
rationing at the macro-level and better than rationing with practice
plans because it is more sensitive to the needs of individual cases.
Even if this argument were true, it does not comport with tradi-
tional ethics. That is why proponents of bedside rationing argue
for a change in the traditional physician-patient relationship. Re-
gardless of whether traditional ethics would have to be changed,
patients would have to be warned of the possibility of bedside ra-
tioning. Like the problem with disclosure of conflicts of interest,
disclosure of bedside rationing would also be problematic. Imagine
the following sign hanging in your physicians' office:
Warning: While I will strive to always put your needs first, my
responsibility to all the other patients in your HMO may on
occasion force me to limit care that may be of benefit to you.
It is easy to imagine how warnings of bedside rationing, no mat-
ter how subtle, would erode trust in the physician-patient
relationship. Even if physicians engaged in bedside rationing for
The just allocation of resources and changing reimbursement methods present the
physician with ethical problems that cannot be ignored. Two principles are agreed
upon:
1. As a physician performs his or her primary role as a patient's trusted
advocate, he or she has a responsibility to use all health-related re-
sources in a technically appropriate and efficient manner. He or she
should plan workups carefully and avoid unnecessary testing, medica-
tions, surgery, and consultations.
2. Resource allocation decisions are most appropriately made at the policy
level rather than entirely in the context of an individual patient-
physician encounter. Physicians should participate in decisions at the
policy level; should emphasize the value of health to society; and should
base allocations on medical need, cost-effectiveness of treatments, and
proper distribution of benefits and burdens in society.
Ethics Manual, 4th ed., supra note 32, at 588.
100. See Daniel P. Sulmasy, Physicians, Cost Control, and Ethics, 116 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 920, 921-23 (1992).
101. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 10; Ubel & Arnold, supra note 8. See also HALL,
MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS, supra note 7, at 127-34; Hall, Rationing Health Care, supra
note 10, at 700-19; Miles & Koepp, supra note 8, at 308. For a discussion of the criteria nec-
essary for an action to qualify as bedside rationing, see Peter A. Ubel & Susan Goold,
Recognizing Bedside Rationing: Clear Cases and Tough Calls, 126 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 74, 75
(1997).
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social goals and even if they did not receive incentives for doing
less (certainly a more ethically laudable situation), patients would
still not know if physicians were acting in their best interest or were
simply rationing care when they were reassured by their physicians
that nothing more needed to be done.
Bedside rationing creates other problems in the physician-
patient relationship in addition to loss of trust. As mentioned
above, many codes of ethics prohibit bedside rationing. 10 2 Further-
more, many commentators have argued that physicians have no
special ability to ration, and may not ration fairly. 13 Physicians may
impose their own values when making rationing judgments be-
cause as a group they are no more insightful about their prejudices
than any other professional group. Physicians do, however, ration
bed space in intensive care units, and no evidence of systematic
abuse has been documented. 10 4 Unfortunately, these are not analo-
gous situations. When physicians engage in rationing ICU beds,
they are directly comparing one patient's needs against another
patient's needs. Any prejudices that they harbor in their subcon-
scious would soon become evident to other physicians and to the
nursing staff. These people would likely question the physicians'
decisions. Physicians would become conscious of their prejudice
and thus, as any group of people who are of good will, would avoid
acting on them. In contrast, bedside rationing is more analogous
to the subtle changes of behavior that may occur with conflicts of
interest, and as pointed out in the discussion on conflicts of inter-
est, physicians are no more immune than any other professional
group to subtle influences on their behavior.
In deciding whether bedside rationing is a good idea, one must
balance its benefits with its burdens. This is a classic risks versus
benefits analysis. The burdens include the following: the erosion of
trust, the risk to minorities of unfair treatment, and the need to
alter fundamentally the nature of the physician-patient relation-
ship. These burdens would have to be balanced against the gain in
efficiency of using bedside rationing instead of some form of
macro-level rationing. I believe that the burdens greatly outweigh
the benefits, because trust is too important to the therapeutic rela-
tionship to allow this degree of erosion, and the risk of unintended
unfairness in rationing would be too socially disruptive. The need
for advocacy and the need to put patients first, especially during
this time of changing ethos and financial incentives, is too great to
102. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 30, at 144.
103. See Hall, Rationing Health Care, supra note 10, at 714-15.
104. See id. at 715.
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allow the dissolution of the traditional physician-patient relation-
ship. Physicians must not abandon their patients at the time when
they are needed most.
Proponents0 5 have countered that despite the pressures imposed
by MCOs on physician behavior, the quality of health care under
managed care has not suffered.'0 6 While it is true that quality indi-
cators are an important check on whether cost-cutting incentives
also cut quality, unfortunately, we currently have very poor meas-
ures of quality. °7 The current indicators are insensitive, and do not
adequately take into account case mix.' 8 Also, when so-called
105. See, e.g., id. at 716; KONGSTVEDT, supra note 2, at 61.
106. See generally FredJ. Hellinger, The Effect of Managed Care on Quality: A Review of Recent
Evidence, 158 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 833 (1998) (surveying recent evidence about the
relationship between managed care and quality).
107. See Francis B. Palummbo & C. Daniel Mullins, Quality-of-Care Data from Managed-
Care Organizations, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 443, 443-44 (1997) (urging the Health Care
Financing Administration to improve the collection of outcomes data on Medicare
recipients enrolled in HMOs); see also Marcia Angell & Jerome Kassirer, Quality and the
Medical Marketplace-Following Elephants, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 883, 883 (1996). They
connect the sudden concern about quality of medical care to the fact that "[t]he quality of
health care is now seriously threatened by our rapid shift to managed care as the way to
contain costs." Id. at 883. They go on to discuss some of the problems with measuring
quality. Two such problems are that it is much easier to measure quality in a population
than in an individual and that preventive measures are often reported despite the fact that it
is the care of the sick that most interests patients. See id. at 884 ("Finally, even if criteria are
developed to measure and monitor the outcomes of treatment of complex illnesses, we have
little confidence that they will ever be sensitive enough to individual variation to give us a
solid basis for paying health plans according to case mix.").
For a detailed discussion of the quality of care, see generally the six-part series on Quality
of Health Care: David Blumenthal, Part 1: Quality of Care-What Is It?, 335 NEW ENG.J. MED.
891 (1996) (examining alternative definitions of quality of care); Robert H. Brook et al., Part
2: Measuring Quality of Care, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 966 (1996) (discussing approaches to
measuring quality of care); Mark Chassin, Part 3: Improving the Quality of Care, 335 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1060, 1060-62 (1996); David Blumenthal, Part 4: The Origins of the Quality-of-Care
Debate, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1146, 1146-48 (1996); Donald M. Berwick, Part 5: Payment by
Capitation and the Quality of Care, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1227, 1227-30 (1996); David Blu-
menthal & Arnold M. Epstein, Part 6: The Role of Physicians in the Future of Quality Management,
335 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1328, 1328-31 (1996).
In a response to the Letters to the Editor regarding this series, the Editors, Angell and
Kassirer, conclude their comments by stating:
Despite the optimism of Mr. Bailit and Boulter et al., quality measures are in their in-
fancy. The question is whether they are good enough, even though not perfect, to
counter the financial incentives to stint on care. We think they are not and that rely-
ing on them now would be falsely reassuring.
Marcia Angell &Jerome Kassirer, Correspondence: Quality and the Medical Marketplace, 336 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 808, 809 (1997) [hereinafter Angell & Kassirer, Correspondence]. For more on
the limitations in measuring the quality of care, see Jerome P. Kassirer, The Quality of Care
and the Quality of Measuring It, 329 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1263, 1263-64 (1993).
108. See Angell & Kassirer, Correspondence, supra note 107, at 809.
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"report cards" are used to measure pre-defined specific criteria,
MCOs simply focus their efforts on those specific criteria."" As a
result, high scores do not necessarily reflect the quality of overall
care. Also, measurements of patient satisfaction or utilization rate,
parameters that are commonly measured, are not indicators of
quality."' In fact, patient satisfaction regarding their health care
experience may be much more dependent on the responsiveness
of nurses and the quality of food than on the quality of the care
they received. 1 2 Thus, arguments based on preservation of quality,
at this stage ofour ability to measure quality, are not convincing.
B. Macro-Level Rationing
It is clear that the burdens of bedside rationing are significant,
but what about the benefits of increased efficiency? To put the
question in reverse: if bedside rationing is the least bad alternative,
just how bad are the other alternatives? Consider the following ex-
ample of rationing at the macro-level: Assume that the artificial
heart has been perfected and that it can be powered by an internal
miniature nuclear power plant. There would be no external lines,
no machine to be tethered to, and with the new valve design, no
embolic strokes. It would be a marvel of technology, and hundreds
of thousands of patients would benefit from this device. Some pa-
tients, however, would benefit much more than others, because
some patients could be restored to a full quality of life, while other
patients would still live a very restricted life. Furthermore, some
patients could live an additional ten years or more, while other pa-
tients would die anyway in a short time. The major problem with
this device is its high cost of over one million dollars. If it were im-
planted in everyone who would benefit, the cost would be over
several hundred billion dollars plus recurring annual costs of sev-
eral billion dollars as new patients developed a need. Clearly,
society could not afford to implant this device in everyone who
could benefit.
109. An example of such a report card is the Health Plan Employer Data and Informa-
tion Set (HEDIS). "HEDIS is the brainchild of the NCQA [National Committee on Quality
Assurance] and rates five categories of MCO performance [quality, access, satisfaction, utili-
zation, and finances]." LA PUMA & SCHIEDERMAYER, supra note 3, at 52.
110. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 474
(1995).
111. See Blumenthal & Epstein, supra note 107, at 1328.
112. Cf Susan M. Wolf, Quality Assessment of Ethics in Health Care: The Accountability Revo-
lution, 20 AM.J.L. & MED. 105, 124 (1994).
SUMMER 1999]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The device must be rationed, and the rationing could be done
in one of three ways. First, use of the device could be denied to
everyone except participants of a small ongoing experimental
study. Second, the device could be distributed based on a very
strict set of criteria, such that those who would gain the most dra-
matic benefit receive the device. This approach has at least three
problems:" 3 1) creating the criteria would be difficult and in the
end would be somewhat arbitrary; 2) value judgments would be
needed to decide which outcome would be better;114 and 3) some
individual patients might benefit greatly, but not meet the criteria.
The third method of rationing the device would allow physicians to
choose individual patients that they thought would benefit the
most (bedside rationing). This would prevent the problem of ex-
cluding patients who would benefit greatly, but who were denied
access because they did not meet the rigid criteria. While being
more efficient (more sensitive to nuances of patient differences) in
this respect, the approach suffers from the same problems as the
rigid criteria. However, in this case the physicians would be setting
the criteria and making the value judgments themselves. Addition-
ally, there would be all the burdens engendered by the erosion of
trust, the risk of unfair treatment, and the loss of the traditional
physician-patient relationship.
This example may seem too esoteric; nevertheless, the biggest
problem with the cost of health care is the steep slope of rising
costs. The biggest reason for this steep slope is the emergence of
new half-way technologies. As discussed above, these new tech-
nologies cost more for each margin of new benefit."5 Dealing with
new technologies is important in controlling health care costs.
Clearly, macro-level rationing (while broad based, heavy handed,
and insensitive to a few patients for whom the rationing criteria
seems to treat unfairly) is capable of restricting the flow of new
technology and thus of controlling costs.
113. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., %%o Should Determine When Health Care Is Medically Neces-
sary?, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 229, 230-31 (1999). The authors include the following three
items in their discussion of the problems and limitations of the use of generalized evidence
of medical necessity. First, applying general rules arbitrarily to all cases is problematic.
"Accounting for individual variation is part and parcel of clinical practice and is largely what
medical practice is all about." Id. at 230. Second, "the choice of an outcome is inherently
value-laden." Id. Third, "[m]uch of medical practice is the result of tradition and collective
experience. Many basic medical interventions have not been studied rigorously." Id. at 231.
114. For example, which is the better standard, a longer life or a better-quality life? Eld-
erly people would not live as long as younger people and so would be denied access if the
former standard were used. On the other hand, disabled people might be the losers if the
latter standard were applied.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
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A current example is the escalating cost of medication. 16 New
drugs cost more, and demand is greater."7 The demand is greater
because of pharmaceutical advertising to physicians and direct
market advertising to patients."" To control this demand, most
HMOs have drug formularies that limit the number of drugs that
the health plan will cover. Drugs prescribed that are not on the
formulary usually cost the plan members considerably more
money. Thus, drug formularies are an example of macro-level ra-
tioning. Rationing of drugs in this way avoids the conflict of
interest created by bedside rationing and by incentives to spend
less. Physicians may still advocate for their patient and in most
plans can appeal the decision regarding coverage. Physicians may
also have input into the selection of drugs for the formulary.
Another example of macro-level rationing is the use of practice
plans. Practice plans are guidelines for the physician to follow in
the treatment of a particular disease or for the workup of a specific
sign or symptom. For example, there is a set of guidelines for dos-
ing heparin (an anticoagulant or blood thinner that is
administered intravenously). "9 The initial dose is based on weight
and subsequent doses are based on the results of a clotting test
(partial thromboplastin time) . Use of this guideline has been
demonstrated to achieve anticoagulation more quickly and with
fewer episodes of over-anticoagulation. 2' Thus, its use improves
patient care and may shorten hospital stays and save money. Such
guidelines, if based on good scientific evidence, and if used by phy-
sicians as a guide to thinking instead of as a substitute for thinking,
can improve the quality of care while decreasing costs. Unfortu-
nately, for many areas of medicine such guidelines would be too
complicated to be useful or the scientific data would be too sparse
to allow creation of scientifically sound guidelines. Also, scientifi-
cally sound, complicated guidelines can be very expensive, and can
116. See William T. Elliott, Pharmacology Update: The Latest Information on New Drugs and
New Indications, 3 PHYSICIAN'S THERAPEUTICS & DRUG ALERT 33, 34 (1998). Elliot notes:
Drug costs continue to escalate at a rate of 12-15% each year representing the fastest
growing segment of the healthcare economy.... Newer drug technologies may be
more efficacious, safer, or easier to take than the older medications they are replac-
ing, but the cost is often 10-100 times the cost of the older medication.
Id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See Robert A. Raschke et al., The Weight-Based Heparin Dosing Nomogram Compared
with a "Standard Care"Nomogram, 119 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 874, 874-81 (1993).
120. See id. at 875.
121. Seeid. at 876.
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become outdated before they are implemented. Finally, many
HMOs promote guidelines solely to control costs, a back door to
rationing.12 2 Consequently, guidelines must be used with caution.
Their scientific basis must be verified, and physicians must not use
them as mere cookbooks, giving no thought to the suggestions.
Based on the examples given above, the promoters of bedside
rationing are correct in saying that the alternatives to bedside ra-
tioning are problematic, but it does not necessarily follow that
bedside rationing is the best alternative. In fact, given the extensive
discussion above about the physician-patient relationship, the
problems created by conflicts of interest, and the incompatibility of
bedside rationing with the traditional physician relationship, I be-
lieve macro-level rationing is the better choice.
CONCLUSION
While rationing health care is clearly necessary, it does not fol-
low that MCOs ration properly.12 3 First, MCOs have refused to
acknowledge their attempts to ration health care. Second, giving
money to physicians to encourage them to spend less money on
their patients creates an impermissible conflict of interest. Third,
MCOs' practice of preventing full disclosure to patients regarding
the financial incentives provided to physicians violates the duty of
informed consent. Nevertheless, physicians also have to take re-
sponsibility for their role in rationing health care.
The traditional physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary rela-
tionship. Within this relationship, physicians owe their patients a
duty to respect autonomy, a duty of advocacy, and a duty to create
an atmosphere that will foster the growth of a trusting relationship.
The duty of advocacy has limits imposed by law, by standards of
122. See David Orentlicher, Practice Guidelines: A Limited Role in Resolving Rational Deci-
sions, 46J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 369, 369 (1998). Orentlicher starts with the assumption
that practice guidelines are promoted "to allocate healthcare resources tinder managed
care"; he then goes on to argue that despite what many people believe, "guidelines are not
objective, medically based measures but are heavily value laden." Id. These values are cam-
ouflaged by "a veneer of scientific objectivity." Id.
123. In addition, under managed care the number of uninsured has continued to in-
crease, and there are signs that health care costs are starting to escalate again. See generally
Eli Ginzberg, The Uncertain Future of Managed Care, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 144, 144-46
(1999). Also, because MCOs have driven down revenues, many hospitals can no longer af-
ford charity care. SeeJennifer Preston, Hospitals Look on Charity Care as Unaffordable Option of
Past: Squeezed by Managed Care and Reduced Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1996, at Al. For a cynical
view of how MCOs make profits, see Jerome P. Kassirer, The New Health Care Game, 335 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 433, 433 (1996). 0
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medical practice, and by physicians' sense of good stewardship.
Also, as I have argued, the duty of advocacy does not include the
provision of marginally beneficial services. The duty to foster trust
is seriously compromised by conflicts of interest, and because of
the importance of trust in the therapeutic relationship, all conflicts
of interest ought to be avoided whenever possible. 124 Patients' trust
is also compromised by their perception that physicians are power-
less to protect them from nameless administrators who might deny
them needed care sometime in the future. Finally, trust is also
compromised by bedside rationing.
While bedside rationing may be more efficient and sensitive to
the nuances of individual patients, it is not the only way to ration
health care. Macro-level plans are an effective means of rationing
new technology and thus controlling the steep rate of growth of
health care expenditures. Because of the importance of trust in the
therapeutic relationship and the risk that bedside rationing im-
poses on that trust, macro-level rationing is preferred.
Physicians have a duty to their patients and to society. The fu-
ture of medicine and health care depends on how these competing
duties are balanced. I believe the duties physicians owe to society
must be carried out in the context of the traditional physician-
patient relationship. Rationing should be done at the macro-level.
Bedside rationing and financial incentives to limit care should be
abandoned. Physicians have a duty to practice efficiently and to use
the least expensive effective options. In addition, they ought to
avoid providing marginally effective, socially disproportionate care.
They also have a duty to lend their expertise to help create the best
possible macro-level rationing plans. On the other hand, physicians
must advocate for their patients and foster the growth of trust with
their patients.
124. Conflicts of interest are inherent in medical practice and cannot be completely
eliminated; however, they should not be encouraged. Also, some conflicts of interest are too
strong to be permitted. For example, withholding more than 25% of a physician's salary to
encourage decreased spending, placing a physician's contract at risk for advocating too
strongly for denied care for her patient, or forcing individual physicians to pay out of their
pocket for specialty referrals will likely compromise the ordinary physician's judgment.
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